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We study the political consequences of policy preferences which
are non-symmetric around the peak. While the usual assumption of
symmetric preferences is innocuous in political equilibria with plat-
forms convergence, it is not neutral when candidates are di⁄erentiated.
We show that a larger government size emerges when preferences of
the median voter o⁄-the-peak are more intense towards overprovision
(what we call wasteful preferences), whereas a smaller government re-
sults when her preferences are more intense towards underprovision
(scrooge preferences). We then analyze the determinants of prefer-
ences o⁄-the-peak and ￿nd that: (i) The sign of the third derivative of
the policy-induced utility function indicates whether preferences are
wasteful (positive) or scrooge (negative). (ii) The analog of Kimball￿ s
coe¢ cient of prudence can be used to measure degrees of wastefulness
and scroogeness. (iii) Consumers￿risk aversion and government de-
creasing e⁄ectiveness in producing the public good generate scrooge
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1preferences, giving some electoral advantage to candidates proposing
less public spending.
Key-words: Single-peaked preferences, citizen-candidate, coe¢ -
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1 Introduction
Many models of political competition assume that preferences of voters over
policies are single-peaked and symmetric around the peak. In fact, the as-
sumption that voters possess quadratic preferences over policies is the most
standard one in models that study the strategic behavior of candidates.
There are however notable exceptions, such as the classical downsian model
of political competition (Black, 1948; Downs, 1957), whose only restriction
is single-peakedness.1 In a well-known result, this model predicts that the
two competing platforms converge in equilibrium to the median voter￿ s bliss
point, which obviously renders the non-symmetry of voters￿preferences in-
nocuous. Nevertheless, and despite its profound in￿ uence, the median voter
theorem does not fully satisfy political scientists because that prediction is
not in line with what we observe in real-world electoral competition.2
In the last decades, a number of articles have presented models of elec-
toral competition where equilibrium platforms are di⁄erentiated. For in-
stance, Calvert (1985) and Wittman (1983) derived separation of platforms
from policy-motivated candidates with uncertainty on the distribution of
voters. Likewise, Osborne and Slivinski (1996) and Besley and Coate (1997)
separately proposed the citizen-candidate model where equilibria with di⁄er-
entiated platforms exist too. Their model intends to capture the essence of
the workings of elections in representative democracies. The idea behind it
is that, within representative democracies, it is citizen themselves and not
their proposals that voters choose from. Placing a credibility restriction on
the policy proposals of potential candidates, and a rationality clause on cit-
izens￿behavior, the model explains both the decision to run in an election
(the number and types of candidates) and the possible outcomes.
1Another exception is given by the directional voting model due to Rabinowitz and
Macdonald (1989), in which preferences are asymmetric.
2Another critic that has been put forward is that the downsian model does not account
for preferences of politicians over policies (e.g. Roemer, 2001).
2In this paper, we follow the citizen-candidate approach to show that when-
ever separation of platforms holds in equilibrium, the non-symmetry of vot-
ers￿preferences over policies is not an innocuous feature anymore. We intro-
duce two natural alternatives to symmetric preferences, asymmetric towards
overprovision ￿ which we name wasteful policy preferences￿and asymmetric
towards underprovision ￿which we name scrooge policy preferences￿and
prove that each of these alternatives has a di⁄erent impact on the predicted
size of government: a larger government size is derived as a policy compromise
whenever preferences of the median are wasteful. In turn, when preferences
of the median are scrooge, the policy compromise entails a smaller govern-
ment size. Furthermore, we show that, with scrooge or wasteful preferences,
a regularity condition imposed on the slope of the marginal utility of public
spending guarantees that more polarization of candidates is translated into
greater di⁄erences between the peak of the median and the predicted policy.
We next study policy preferences o⁄-the-peak. Even if we focus attention
on the citizen-candidate model, our analysis on non-symmetric preferences is
generally applicable to every two-party political competition model in which
candidates choose separated platforms (e.g. Wittman, 1983, Caplin and
Nalebu⁄, 1997).3 In this line, we show that the third derivative of the util-
ity representation of policy preferences with respect to the policy variable
indicates the direction of the non-symmetry of preferences, with positive
sign indicating wasteful preferences, and a negative one implying scrooge
preferences. When the third derivative equals zero, in turn, preferences are
symmetric. The sign of the third derivative of the relevant utility function
has already been shown to have important implications in other economic
settings. For example, in the theory of precautionary saving due to Kimball
(1990), the sign of the third derivative of the utility function over consump-
tion governs the presence or absence of a precautionary saving motive (where
precautionary saving means to forego consumption this period when there is
uncertainty about future periods).4 In fact, we ￿nd that we can apply the
3Two-candidate electoral competition is empirically relevant (see, for instance Jones,
1999; Wright and Riker,1989) and theoretically important: not only many models assume
the exogenous existence of two political contestants, also the citizen-candidate model with
sincere voters predicts the existence of just two-candidate equilibria for wide regions of
the parameter set (Osborne and Slivinski, 1996).
4Groseclose (2001) also ￿nds that the sign of the third derivative of the distant function
between the ideal policy of voters and the implemented policy indicates whether swing
voters prefer moderate movements form high-valence than low-valence candidates.
3analog to Kimball￿ s coe¢ cient of prudence to compare the degree of scroo-
geness or wastefulness of di⁄erent policy preferences.
We also use the sign of the third derivative to analyze what factors drive
preferences to be wasteful or scrooge. We show that a positive coe¢ cient of
prudence (or, equivalently, DARA and CARA speci￿cations of voters￿risk
aversion), as well as government decreasing e⁄ectiveness, drive preferences
of voters to be scrooge. Wasteful preferences emerge if public expenditure
enters as an input of either a capital production function or a health produc-
tion function displaying more intense decreasing returns at lower investment
levels. Our analysis reveals as well that the symmetry property of policy
preferences holds only under quite stringent conditions.
Finally, we provide some numerical examples with plausible parameters
that illustrate our theoretical results. We compare preferences of a median
voter with di⁄erent coe¢ cients of risk aversion. We show in the proposed
examples that more risk aversion makes preferences "more scrooge". As a
consequence, there exists greater divergence between the policy preferred by
the median voter and the compromise policy that emerges from every two-
candidate equilibria according to the citizen candidate approach.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. The next section
presents a general model of public good provision where the political process
follows the citizen-candidate approach. Section 3 introduces three types of
preferences over public expenditure o⁄-the-peak: symmetric, wasteful and
scrooge, and inquires about their implications for the outcome of the electoral
process. In that section we also characterize and compare the proposed types
of preferences. Section 4 analyzes the determinants of policy preferences o⁄-
the-peak in terms of the primitives of the model. Section 5 provides some
numerical examples that quantify our theoretical results. Section 6 concludes.
2 A general policy problem
Consider a jurisdiction populated by a continuum of households with mass
normalized to unity. Households are heterogeneous with respect to exoge-
nously given income y. Income is distributed across the population according





￿ R+: The income of household i is denoted by yi. The
mean and median income of the overall population are denoted by ~ y and ym,
respectively.
4Preferences of household i are de￿ned over bundles of private consump-
tion xi 2 R+, and public expenditure e 2 R+. Units of quality of the publicly
provided good are normalized to be measured in units of the numeraire. Pref-
erences have continuous utility representation U(xi;e), with strictly positive
marginal utility in both arguments.
Public expenditures are ￿nanced through taxation levied on every house-
hold. Each household tax bill depends on the level of public expenditure
and income. Household i￿ s tax bill is described by a continuous function
￿ (e;yi) ￿ 0, strictly increasing in the level of public expenditure. The tax
bill is constrained to balanced government budget, so that every function ￿
satis￿es Z ￿ y
y
￿(e;y)f(y)dy = e: (1)





Households choose private consumption in a decentralized way. From
strictly increasing marginal utility in private consumption, xi = yi￿￿ (e;yi).6
Induced preferences over public expenditure are derived from the indirect
utility function (or policy-induced utility) of household i which can be written
as
V (e;yi) ￿ U(yi ￿ ￿ (e;yi);e): (2)
While the utility representation U is identical across households, heterogene-
ity in income induces heterogenous preferences over public expenditure. We
use V 0; V 00; V 000 to denote the ￿rst, second and third derivatives of V with
respect to e. We assume that V is a C3 function in argument e.
The following conditions on V are useful in the analysis that follows. The
two ￿rst conditions on single-peakedness and single-crossing are standard.
The third condition is a novel condition that, as we show below, provides
additional insights into the nature of non-symmetric preferences over public
expenditure.
Single-Peaked (SP): V has a maximizer and is strictly quasi-concave in e.
Strict Single-Crossing (SSC): V 0 is strictly monotonic in y.
5This constraint imposes an upper bound on the total amount of public expenditure.
6For instance, under proportional income taxation, optimal private consumption is
xi = yi ￿ tyi where t is the marginal tax rate. According to (1) we have t = e
~ y where ~ y
denotes mean income, from where ￿(e;yi) =
eyi
~ y .
5Monotonic Satiation (MS): V 00 is strictly monotonic in e.









Every household is worse o⁄ as the distance between a policy e and their
ideal policy increases. Condition SP characterizes the entire domain of single
peaked preference relations.7 When the ideal policy of a household i is derived
as an interior solution to (3), we have V 0(e
p
i;yi) = 0.
In turn, SSC is a su¢ cient condition that guarantees that majority pref-
erences and preferences of the household with median income coincide.8 By
this condition, V 0 can be either strictly increasing or strictly decreasing in
income. In the former case, rich households prefer more public expenditure
than poor ones (e.g. public education). In the latter, the opposite holds, i.e.,
rich households prefer less public expenditure than poor ones (e.g. income
redistribution).
Finally, MS is a regularity condition that restricts changes in the marginal
utility of public expenditure to be strictly monotonic. According to MS, the
marginal utility derived from public expenditure is either a strictly concave or
a strictly convex function. Strict concavity of the marginal utility function
implies that the principle of diminishing marginal utility (which basically
captures the process of satiation) applies with increasing intensity. Thus,
marginal utility derived from public expenditure falls faster at higher level
of public expenditure. Strict convexity of course implies the opposite, that
marginal utility falls more slowly at higher level of public expenditure.9
Citizen-candidate approach
7Of course, this characterization accounts for a convex policy space and preferences
with utility representation. Preferences over policies are single-peaked when the most
preferred policy of household i is a singleton e
p
i; and for every pair of policies e;e0 we have




i > e > e0.
8In fact, this is the one-dimensional version of the Spence-Mirrlees condition that char-
acterizes the domain of strict single crossing preferences (see Milgrom, 1994; Gans and
Smart, 1996). In our model, preferences over policies are strict single-crossing when for
all e0 6= e; and for all yj > yi; if V (e;yi) > V (e0;yi) then V (e;yj) > V (e0;yj):
9Monotonic satiation is not such a stringent assumption as it may in principle seem.
For example, CARA or DARA preferences for private consumption entail u000 > 0, i.e.,
that its marginal utility falls slower at high levels of consumption (e.g. Kimball, 1990).
6The electoral process that determines the level of public expenditure in
the jurisdiction follows the citizen-candidate pattern. This process has three
stages. In stage 1, candidates declare themselves, in stage 2, households vote,
choosing one among the candidates, and in stage 3 the winning candidate
implements her platform. We study equilibria with two competing candi-
dates, which we name Low (L) and High (H). Their platforms specify an
amount of public expenditure, and are denoted by eL and eH respectively,
where eL ￿ eH.
In stage 1, households simultaneously decide whether or not to become
candidates. In doing so, they must weigh, on the one hand, some positive
entry costs, c > 0, against, on the other hand, some positive bene￿ts derived
from holding o¢ ce, b ￿ 0, and from choosing or a⁄ecting policy. Therefore,
incentives to become candidate can be direct, from winning (or tying) the
elections, or indirect, from a⁄ecting the candidate that wins. In the latter
case, the entry cost would be compensated by enjoying a better policy. In
stage 2, each household casts a vote. We consider sincere voting, i.e., each
household votes for the candidate whose platform better matches their own
policy preferences.10 By plurality voting rule, the candidate that achieves
more votes becomes the winning candidate. Finally, in stage 3, the winning
candidate implements her policy. If two candidates tie, we take the midpoint
of their platforms as the result of a policy compromise between the two
winning candidates and denote it with e￿. In such case, the bene￿ts each
candidate derives from holding o¢ ce reduce to b=2.
A two-candidate equilibrium is a (pure strategy) Nash equilibrium at the
entry stage with the particularity that just two voters become candidates.
De￿nition: A two-candidate equilibrium is given by a pair of platforms
(eL;eH) such that no candidate improves withdrawing from the contest, and
no other voter improves by becoming candidate.
In every two-candidate equilibrium, the platforms of the candidates pre-
vent the entry of a newcomer while providing incentives to stay in the race.
For every possible distribution of income across households, we guarantee
existence of two-candidate equilibria. To prove this statement, we extend the
proof of Osborne and Slivinski (1996) to preferences over policies satisfying
SP and SSC.11 The proof is in the Appendix.
10We thus assume that voters only care for candidates￿ platform and not for other
personal characteristics.
11Osborne and Slivinski assume that preferences of voters over policies are symmetric
7Proposition 1 Assume that policy preferences satisfy SP and SSC. If b >
2c, there always exist two-candidate equilibria. Furthermore, in every two-
candidate equilibrium, candidates tie.
The incentives of candidates to stay in the race are derived from the
fact that each candidate, in equilibrium, gathers the same proportion of
votes. This equilibrium property implies that the median voter must be
indi⁄erent between the equilibrium platforms. By SSC, the median voter
coincides with the median income household, so that, in every equilibrium
V (eL;ym) = V (eH;ym). By SP, the equilibrium platforms must be located
at di⁄erent sides of the peak of the median, i.e., eL < ep
m < eH. Since the
median never fully satis￿es her policy preferences, and only candidates that
make her indi⁄erent may run together in an electoral race, the pivotal role
of the median is di⁄erent from that played in the downsian model.12
Multiple two-candidate equilibria exist. It is worth mentioning, however,
that the downsian equilibrium in which both candidates propose the peak
of the median, is not an equilibrium in the citizen-candidate model.13 Note
also that for some income distributions, in equilibrium, candidates cannot
be located too far from each other, since an additional candidate in between
them could enter the race and win.
3 Preferences o⁄-the-peak
In this section, we introduce two alternatives to symmetry ￿ which we name
wasteful and scrooge policy preferences￿and we inquire about their impli-
cations for the outcome of the electoral process. We also characterize the
proposed types of preferences and provide a coe¢ cient that measures the
degree of scroogeness or wastefulness.
De￿nitions of preferences
Given household i￿ s peak e
p
i and letting d be a positive amount of public
expenditure, we say that policy preferences of household i are symmetric
around the peak and that voters only di⁄er in their peak. Under their assumption, SSC
is obviously satis￿ed.
12An equivalent pivotal role of the median is also considered in Duggan and Fey (2006,
Theorem 5).
13This point is made by Palfrey (1984) who argues that two candidates with di⁄erenti-
ated platforms located at each side of the median prevents the entry of a candidate with
more extremist platform.
8(around the peak) when
V (e
p
i ￿ d;yi) = V (e
p
i + d;yi) for all d 2 (0;e
p
i):
In that case, household i is indi⁄erent between any two policies that are
equidistant to their peak.14
We consider two natural alternatives to symmetry. These alternatives
capture how tolerant are households with respect to overprovision and un-
derprovision with respect to their peak. Suppose household i is given a choice
between two symmetric deviations from their peak, e
p
i ￿d and e
p
i +d, we say
that their preferences are wasteful whenever
V (e
p
i ￿ d;yi) < V (e
p
i + d;yi) for all d 2 (0;e
p
i):
Thus, o⁄-the-peak, that household prefers an excess in public expenditure
over its symmetric defect. In the opposite case, that is whenever
V (e
p
i ￿ d;yi) > V (e
p
i + d;yi) for all d 2 (0;e
p
i);
we say that preferences of household i are scrooge,15 which implies that
household i prefers a defect from the peak over its symmetric excess. Figure
1 illustrates these notions.
Our de￿nition of wasteful or scrooge preferences is not related to the
location of the peak of the preferences. The extent to which these two types
of non-symmetric preferences emerge from reasonable assumptions on the
primitives of the policy problem is analyzed in the following section.
Policy implications of wasteful and scrooge preferences
As it follows from Proposition 1, in every two-candidate equilibrium
(eL;eH) condition V (eL;ym) = V (eH;ym) holds. As a consequence, if pref-
erences of the median are symmetric, then the policy compromise is ep
m,
14Let ￿ e be the upper bound in public expenditure. We implicitly assume that 2e
p
i < ￿ e:
If such restriction does not hold, we need to de￿ne symmetry in the truncated interval
[0; ￿ e]; while this would be more rigorous, it does not provide additional insights into our
analysis. Note also that this de￿nition, together with the subsequent de￿nitions of wasteful
and scrooge preferences, only apply when e
p
i is an interior solution.
15Our choice of the term ￿ scrooge￿is motivated by Ebenezer Scrooge, an extremely mean
character in Charles Dickens￿A Christmas Carol.
9however, if preferences of the median are wasteful or scrooge, the equilib-
rium platforms cannot be equidistant to the peak of the median.16 Thus,
when preferences of the median are wasteful, e￿ > ep
m and when preferences
of the median are scrooge, e￿ < ep
m (Figure 2 illustrates this point). The
proposed arguments prove our next result.
Proposition 2 Assume that policy preferences satisfy SP and SSC, then the
compromise policy in every two-candidate equilibrium:
- coincides with the peak of the median when her preferences are symmetric,
- is above the peak of the median when her preferences are wasteful,
- is below the peak of the median when her preferences are scrooge.
Thus, the two proposed alternatives to symmetric preferences entail the
existence of a wedge between the peak of the median and the equilibrium
policy compromise. It is important to stress that only the shape of the
median voter preferences o⁄-the-peak matters to derive the above result. In
turn, by the SSC condition, the only relevant aspect of preferences of non-
decisive voters is the location of the peak (whether it is to the right or to the
left of the median).
16Even if we account for uncertainty on the location of the median voter, the expected
median as well as her preferences o⁄-the-peak are relevant to predict the winning candidate
when the two candidates at stage have di⁄erent platforms (see Wittman, 1983).
10The shape of preferences o⁄-the-peak generate di⁄erent con￿gurations of
two-candidate equilibria. The following proposition throws some additional
light over the properties of the multiplicity of two-candidate equilibria. For
that, we restrict attention to policy preferences satisfying MS. We show that
whenever preferences of the median are wasteful, the equilibrium policy con-
sists of more public expenditure the more extremist equilibrium candidates
are, whilst in cases where her preferences are scrooge, it consists of less public
expenditure the more extremist equilibrium candidates are. The proof is in
the Appendix.
Proposition 3 Assume that policy preferences satisfy SP, SSC, MS and that
preferences of the median are either wasteful or scrooge. Then, the more
extremist the two equilibrium platforms are, the larger the wedge between the
compromise policy and the peak of the median.
When preferences are symmetric, every two-candidate equilibrium entails
an equivalent prediction in terms of the compromise policy. When prefer-
ences are non-symmetric, predictions concerning the compromise policy may
vary across di⁄erent two-candidate equilibria. The MS condition makes it
possible to order the multiplicity of equilibria since higher polarization of
the candidates￿platforms is translated into greater divergence between the
peak of the median and the compromise policy. In this way, by computing
11the two-candidate equilibrium with the most extremist candidates, we can
compare the maximum divergence between the peak of the median and the
compromise policy (we account for this in the numerical examples).
On the characterization of preferences
We have shown that the non-symmetry of preferences has relevant policy
implications. For that, we have focused on the citizen-candidate approach.
The following characterization results, in turn, do not depend on the speci￿c
electoral procedure. We ￿rst provide a characterization of preferences that
satisfy SP and that are symmetric (around the peak).
Theorem 1: Assume that policy preferences satisfy SP, then preferences are
symmetric if and only if V 0(e
p
i ￿ d;yi) = ￿V 0(e
p
i + d;yi) for all d 2 (0;e
p
i):
Proof. By SP, when V is symmetric V (e
p
i ￿ d;yi) = V (e
p
i + d;yi) for all
d 2 (0;e
p
i). This implies that at any point e
p
i ￿ d; the e⁄ect on V derived
from increasing e
p
i ￿ d in any amount, is equal to the e⁄ect on V derived
from decreasing e
p
i + d by the same amount. In particular, when modifying
e
p
i ￿d and e
p






Conversely, let V satisfy SP and V 0(e
p
i ￿ d;yi) = ￿V 0(e
p
i + d;yi) for all
d 2 (0;e
p
i), and suppose, by contradiction, that V is non-symmetric. Then,















i ￿ d;yi) > V (e
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i;yi) ￿ V (e
p












i V 0(e;yi)de; which is in contradiction with V 0(e
p
i ￿
d;yi) = ￿V 0(e
p
i + d;yi) for all d 2 (0;e
p
i).
Hence, symmetric preferences require the slope of the policy-induced util-
ity function to be equal in absolute terms at every pair of symmetric devi-
ations from the peak. Clearly, when this condition does not hold, prefer-
ences are non-symmetric. Theorem 1 seems to indicate that, apart from
cases where the marginal function V 0 falls at a constant rate (i.e., whenever
V 000 = 0), symmetry requires a somewhat farfetched behavior of the indirect
utility function in the public spending direction.17
17To see this, note that for any concave interval to the right of the peak, the corre-
sponding (symmetric) interval to the left of the peak must be the exact symmetric but
convex.
12Following the above result, we want to provide a characterization of waste-
ful and scrooge preferences. By restricting the set of preferences according
to MS, we show that the sign of the third derivative of V characterizes the
proposed types of preferences.
Theorem 2: Assume that policy preferences satisfy SP and MS then,
- preferences are wasteful if and only if V 0 is strictly convex in e 2 (0;2e
p
i),
- preferences are scrooge if and only if V 0 is strictly concave in e 2 (0;2e
p
i).
Proof. If V 0 is strictly convex (or, equivalently, V 000 > 0) in e 2 (0;2e
p
i), by
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2d de = 1
2d [V (e
p
i + d;yi) ￿ V (e
p
i ￿ d;yi)].
By continuity of V 0 and SP, V 0(e
p
i;yi) = 0; and V (e
p
i + d;yi) > V (e
p
i ￿ d;yi)
for all d 2 (0;e
p
i), preferences are wasteful. If V 0 is strictly concave, the sign
of Expression (4) is reversed and this proves that preferences are scrooge.
Conversely, let preferences be wasteful and suppose that V 0 is not strictly
convex. Then, by MS, V 0 must be strictly concave, which implies that pref-
erences are scrooge, contradicting that preferences are wasteful. Following a
similar line of reasoning, it is straightforward to prove part ii).
The above proof reveals that the SP condition, alongside strict concavity
of V 0 are su¢ cient conditions for scrooge preferences. Likewise, the SP condi-
tion together with strict convexity of V 0 are su¢ cient conditions for wasteful
policy preferences. Only under MS, the strict concavity or convexity of V 0 be-
come necessary conditions for scrooge and wasteful preferences, respectively.
As illustrated in Figure 3, when V 0 is strictly concave, the marginal utility
of public spending falls faster at higher levels of public expenditure. In that
case, the utility loss emerging from receiving too much of public expenditure
(an excess over the peak equal to d) is larger than the utility loss derived
from too low a level of provision (a shortfall over the peak equal to d). Strict
convexity of V 0 obviously implies the opposite: that marginal utility falls
(and satiation occurs) more slowly at higher levels of public expenditure. In
that case, it is more important to avoid a shortfall of spending with respect
to the peak than to incur in an excess.
13Comparative degrees of wastefulness and scroogness
There is an analogy between our result concerning the characterization of
wasteful and scrooge preferences, and the theories developed by Pratt (1964)
and Kimball (1990). According to Pratt￿ s theory of risk aversion, concavity
of a utility function over consumption indicates the presence of risk aver-
sion, while according to Kimball￿ s theory of precautionary savings, concavity
of the marginal utility of second period consumption entails precautionary
savings. In both cases, the degree of concavity of the relevant function mea-
sures risk aversion or precautionary savings. These behavioral traits become
thus comparable across pairs of concave functions such that one is a concave
transformation of the other.
The similarity between our approach and theirs stems from the fact that,
as we show next, under MS and as long as preferences satisfy a stronger
version of SP (strict concavity of V ), the curvature of the marginal policy-
induced utility function determines the degree of non-symmetry of prefer-
ences. We can therefore apply the analog to the coe¢ cient of prudence that
Kimball (1990) proposes, to measure the level of scroogeness or wasteful-
ness.18
18Recall that Kimball￿ s coe¢ cient of prudence is de￿ned as the negative of the third
derivative of the utility function over consumption divided by the second derivative, i.e.
14In order to state and prove this result, we need a precise de￿nition of the
degree of wastefulness and scroogeness of preferences: Consider two di⁄erent





Each of these functions correspond to two di⁄erent households with income
y1 and y2 respectively. The functions ￿1(d) and ￿2(d) are implicitly de￿ned
by each of the following functions
V1(e
p





2 ￿ d;y2) = V2(e
p
2 + ￿2(d);y2):
Thus, by de￿nition, households with preferences represented by Vi are indif-
ferent between two deviations from their peak ep ￿ d and ep +￿i(d). We say











Theorem 3: Let V1;V2 be policy-induced utility functions satisfying strict


















then V2 is more scrooge than V1; and













then V2 is more wasteful than V1:
Proof. Consider the case in which V1 and V2 are scrooge (an analogous
argument proves the result for wasteful preferences). By assumption, V 0
1
and V 0
2 are strictly decreasing functions of e, and can be related by a strictly
increasing transformation g such that V 0
2(e) = g(V 0





(we omit argument y from V 0
1 and V 0
2 in the interest of clarity). I.e., V 0
2 is
obtained as an increasing transformation of V 0
1 with the particularity that
the argument of V 0
1 is normalized to e ￿ ￿. This implies that when e = e
p
2,
g(0) = 0: We di⁄erentiate the expression,19
V 00
2 (e) = g0(V 0
1(e ￿ ￿))V 00
1 (e ￿ ￿)
V 000
2 (e) = g00(V 0
1(e ￿ ￿))[V 00
1 (e ￿ ￿)]
2 + g0(V 0
1(e ￿ ￿))V 000
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V 00
1 (e ￿ ￿)
￿
g00(V 0
1(e ￿ ￿))V 00








19We follow a similar argument to the one used by Pratt (1964), Theorem 1.
15By MS, V 000
1 < 0 and V 000








1 (e￿￿;y) implies g00(V 0
1(e￿
￿)) < 0 (g strictly concave).
By de￿nition of ￿2(d); we have V2(e
p
2 ￿ d) = V2(e
p
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1(e ￿ ￿)de = V1(e
p
1 + ￿2(d)) ￿ V1(e
p
1 ￿ d): Since g is strictly
increasing and g(0) = 0; then V1(e
p
1 + ￿2(d)) ￿ V1(e
p
1 ￿ d) > 0 for all d: Since
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According to this result, policy preferences are more scrooge for the "more
concave" marginal utility representation, and more wasteful for the "more
convex" marginal utility representation. The advantage of using this co-
e¢ cient to measure scroogeness and wastefulness is that it can be easily
calculated for speci￿c applications.
When the peak derived from two di⁄erent policy-induced utility function




1 = 0; and it is possible to compare degrees of








2 (e;y2) for every e < 2e
p
1.
Because it is the curvature around the peak that matters, in cases where the
peak is not reached at the same level of public expenditure, the comparison


















In this case, when e = e
p
2, then e ￿ ￿ = e
p
1; i.e., preferences are compared
around their respective peaks.
Finally, note that, as it occurs in Pratt (1964) and Kimball (1990), the
ordering of preferences according to the level of scroogeness or wastefulness
is a partial ordering (transitive but not complete).
4 Determinants of preferences o⁄-the-peak
The previous section revealed that the size of government in two-candidate
equilibria according to the citizen-candidate approach, as compared to the
16prediction of the downsian equilibrium, depends on the preferences of the
median o⁄-the-peak. In this section, we analyze what may drive preferences
to be symmetric, wasteful, or scrooge.
For expositional purposes, hereafter we analyze the case of quasi-linear
preferences where U(xi;e) = u(xi) + e, yielding the following indirect utility
function
V (e;yi) ￿ u(yi ￿ ￿(e;yi)) + e; (6)
with u0 > 0; ￿0 > 0; u00 ￿ 0; ￿00 ￿ 0; except for u00 = ￿00 = 0.20 The imposed
conditions account for either risk neutral or risk averse households, as well as
for constant or increasing mean taxation (i.e., a household tax bill per unit
of public expenditure may be constant or increasing). It is easy to show that
the proposed conditions guarantee SP, with V strictly concave. In addition,
if the cross derivative ￿00
ey ￿ 0, we can also guarantee SSC.21
As we show below, attitudes toward risk and precautionary savings, as
well as the form of the tax bill plays a central role in shaping the preferences
of households over public expenditure. We measure di⁄erent degrees of risk
aversion according to the Arrow-Pratt￿ s coe¢ cient of absolute risk aversion
rA = ￿u00
u0 . Increasing absolute risk aversion (IARA) holds when r0
A > 0:
Likewise, decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA) and constant absolute
risk aversion (CARA) corresponds to r0
A < 0 and r0
A = 0 respectively.
The generic tax bill function ￿ can capture di⁄erent ￿nance schemes, as
well as di⁄erent degrees of e⁄ectiveness in transforming tax revenues into
public expenditure. We say that the government is constant-e⁄ective when
the scheme ￿ is linear in e. When the government is constant-e⁄ective, every
household faces a linear tax bill in the amount of public expenditure. Partic-
ular instances of constant-e⁄ective governments are given by the lump-sum
tax, where ￿ = e, or the proportional tax, where ￿ =
eyi
~ y with ~ y representing
mean income and where the marginal tax bill per unit of income equals e
~ y. A
progressive or regressive tax scheme can also be constant-e⁄ective. Thus, for
instance, the tax bill function ￿ = e￿(yi) with ￿ strictly increasing in income
is progressive whenever ￿0(y) >
￿(y)
y and regressive when ￿0(y) <
￿(y)
y .22
20Note that if u00 = ￿00 = 0; the ideal policy of each household cannot be derived as an
interior solution to their utility maximization problem.
21To see this, the cross derivative V 00
ey = ￿u00(1￿￿0
y)￿0+u0￿00
ey, where u00 < 0; ￿00
ey ￿ 0 or
u00 = 0;￿00
ey > 0 are su¢ cient conditions for SSC. For instance, under proportional income
taxation, ￿(e;yi) =
eyi
~ y where ~ y is mean income, we have ￿00
ey = 1
~ y which implies that rich
households demand more public expenditure.
22For these functions to qualify as tax bill functions, the government budget must be
17When ￿ is strictly convex in e, we say that government is decreasing-
e⁄ective.23 Convexity of ￿ in e can represent tax distortions, or congestions
in government ability to transform tax revenue into public expenditure. An-
other interpretation is that it represents corruption of public o¢ cials, in
which case convexity of ￿ in e re￿ ects the deviation of tax revenues to other
purposes di⁄erent from public expenditure. Examples of convex ￿ under
lump-sum or proportional income taxation are given by ￿ = e￿ and ￿ =
e￿yi
~ y
(with ￿ > 1) respectively.24 Note that all these forms of decreasing-e⁄ective
government generate a convex La⁄er curve.






















Following the result in Theorem 2, the sign of (9) determines whether
preferences satisfy the symmetric, scrooge or wasteful requirement. The fol-
lowing table summarizes in which cases the primitives of the problem u and
￿ yield each type of policy preferences. We cover most, if not all, the com-
monly used utility functions, as well as all the examples of tax bill functions
we have mentioned.
balanced. This implies ￿ must satisfy
R ￿ y
y ￿(yi)f(y)dy = 1: A particular example of a non-
proportional taxation that satis￿es these requirements is the education ￿nance scheme
studied by BØnabou (2002).
23Related to the convexity of ￿; Krasa and Polborn (2009) analyze the political conse-
cuences derived from di⁄erent parties showing di⁄erent abilities to transform tax revenue
into public good.
24A particular instance of a decreasing-e⁄ective government is considered by Hansen
and Kessler (2001) which we will use in our numerical examples.
18u00 = 0 u00 < 0;u000 = 0 u00 < 0;u000 > 0
￿00 = 0 Symmetric Scrooge
￿00 > 0
￿000 = 0 Symmetric Scrooge Scrooge
￿00 > 0
￿000 > 0 Scrooge Scrooge Scrooge
￿00 > 0








Table 1: Determinants of the shape of preferences o⁄-the-peak
According to Table 1, symmetric preferences unambiguously follow from
either (i) risk neutral households and a particular form of non-constant-
e⁄ective government (where ￿000 = 0), implying that the marginal tax bill
must increase at a constant speed with public expenditure, or (ii) a constant-
e⁄ective government and risk averse households with a speci￿c form of IARA
(derived from u000 = 0, which implies r2
A = r0
A):26 It is worth mentioning
that there are more cases, not considered in the table, where preferences are
symmetric. To identify all these cases, we can check, according to our result
in Proposition 3, the necessary and su¢ cient condition for symmetry, which













i + d;yi) = 2 for all d 2 (0;e
p
i): (10)
Thus, if u00 = 0 and ￿00 > 0 but ￿000 6= 0, preferences will be symmetric as long
as ￿0 is symmetric around e
p
i; or if ￿00 = 0 and u00 < 0 but u000 6= 0; preferences
will be symmetric as long as u0 is symmetric around e
p
i. In the following
25In this case, the third derivative of the indirect utility function writes: V 000 =
u0[￿3rA￿0￿00 ￿ ￿000].
26To show that u000 = 0 implies the IARA condition and where r2
A = r0
A; we take




















19remark, we describe the conditions for symmetric preferences. In doing so,
we disregard these last two cases since, a priori, there is no implicit reason,
but a mathematical argument, for either ￿0 or u0 to satisfy such symmetry
requirements. Furthermore, such cases are not robust to small variations of
￿0 and u0.27
Remark 1: Symmetric preferences only follow from:
i) risk neutral households and a non constant-e⁄ective government charac-
terized by an increasing marginal tax bill with ￿000 = 0,
ii) risk averse households with a speci￿c form of IARA condition with r2
A = r0
A
and a constant-e⁄ective government.
Two particular examples of tax bill functions satisfying case i) are given
by ￿ = e￿ with ￿ = 2 and by ￿ =
e￿yi
~ y with ￿ = 2. Note, however, that
preferences are not symmetric for every ￿ 6= 2. On the other hand, as far
as we know, no commonly used utility function satis￿es the requirement of
case ii).28 Remark 1 thus suggests that symmetric policy preferences require
placing quite stringent restrictions on the primitives of the policy problem.
It also suggests that there are many channels whereby we may move towards
the case of non-symmetric preferences.
Risk neutrality, as well as risk aversion with DARA or CARA speci-
￿cations of risk, are the assumptions more generally invoked in economic
applications. In particular, DARA and CARA speci￿cations of risk corre-
spond best to our basic intuition about attitudes towards risk and to the
available empirical evidence.29 These conditions imply r0
A < 0 and r0
A = 0,






, both cases imply u000 > 0. Like-
wise, a constant-e⁄ective government or a decreasing-e⁄ective government
with a marginal tax bill that increases faster at higher levels of public ex-
penditure seems to us the appropriate form according to economic intuition.
In particular, a tax bill function with ￿00 > 0 re￿ ects increasing congestion
in the government ability to transform tax revenues into public expenditure
27Not to mention the case where u00 < 0;￿00 > 0; and where symmetry requires the
product function g(e;yi) = u0(e)￿0(e;yi) to be symmetric around e
p
i:
28In fact, most of them show derivatives that alternate in sign (u0 > 0;u00 < 0;u000 >
0).This statement is justi￿ed by Pratt and Zeckhauser (1987).
29On the one hand, recent empirical evidence presented by Chiappori and Paiella (2008)
does not give support to the IARA condition. On the other hand, DARA is widely
considered to be reasonable (see Arrow 1971), and as postulated by Pratt (1964): DARA
is implied by such behavior of investing in risky securities as one becomes richer.
20or, following another interpretation, it re￿ ects increasing public corruption
at higher levels of public expenditure. On the contrary, ￿00 < 0 implies that
the relative cost imposed by distortions or corruption (if they exist) are de-
creasing, an assumption that simple economic reasoning does not support.
The following two remarks cover most commonly used utility functions as
well as the most reasonable and widely applicable tax bill functions.
Remark 2: If households are risk neutral and the government is constant-
e⁄ective with the marginal tax bill increasing faster at higher levels of public
expenditure, then preferences are scrooge.
Remark 3: If households are risk averse according to the CARA or DARA
condition, and government is either constant-e⁄ective or decreasing-e⁄ective
with the marginal tax bill increasing faster at higher levels of public expendi-
ture, then preferences are scrooge.
Under a quasi-linear utility representation, scrooge preferences are the
norm. It is intuitive that consumers exhibiting DARA or CARA speci￿ca-
tions of risk are more afraid of too low private consumption (or equivalently,
too high levels of public expenditure) and therefore, they possess scrooge
preferences. Likewise, government decreasing-e⁄ectiveness, with a cost of
raising public funds (or corruption) that increases faster at higher levels of
public expenditure, generates more intense preferences for underprovision,
i.e., scrooge preferences.
An alternative utility representation is given by the quasi-linear (money-
metric) speci￿cation of policy preferences U(xi;e) = xi + h(e): This speci￿-
cation yields the following indirect utility function
V (e;yi) ￿ yi ￿ ￿(e;yi) + h(e); (11)
in which h can be interpreted as a human capital production function, pro-
vided that e measures public expenditure in education. Alternatively, h could
be a health status production function, provided that e measures public ex-
penditure in health care. In both cases, positive and decreasing marginal
returns in production emerge as natural assumptions, i.e., h0 > 0; h00 < 0.
These conditions together with ￿00 ￿ 0 and ￿00
ey guarantee SP and SSC. The





21This reveals that, if the law of diminishing marginal returns applies with
greater intensity at lower levels of public expenditure, then h000 > 0, which
contributes towards wastefulness.
Remark 4: If the government is constant-e⁄ective and the law of diminish-
ing marginal returns to public expenditure applies with greater intensity at
lower levels of public expenditure, then preferences are wasteful.
For instance, Roemer (2001) considers the utility representation U(xi;e) =
xi + 2￿e
1
2. Under proportional income taxation, V = yi ￿ e
yi
~ y + 2￿e
1
2, and
it is straightforward to show that V 000 > 0 and hence, that preferences are
wasteful.
5 Numerical Examples
In the ￿nal part of the analysis we present two numerical examples of equi-
librium. The objective is to further illustrate our results and to provide an
idea of the magnitude of the e⁄ects we study under realistic parameter con-
￿gurations. We do not perform a pure comparative statics exercise, as we
will change two taste parameters at the same time in order to keep the peak
constant. Instead, our intention is to quantify the impact of the shape of pol-
icy preferences o⁄-the-peak for utility con￿gurations with the same median
voter￿ s peak. We adopt a lognormal income distribution that matches the
2006 mean ($66,570) and median ($48,201) income in the US (in thousands).
This requires setting the mean parameter at ￿ = 3:87 and the variance pa-
rameter at ￿ = 0:80.
We follow a particular form of decreasing-e⁄ective government proposed
by Hansen and Kessler (2001). These authors consider proportional income
taxation in addition to a cost associated to raising public funds. Convexity of
the function that captures the cost of raising public funds is translated into





~ y where t2
2
is the cost of raising public funds.








which displays DARA with parameter ￿=x.30 Such speci￿cation yields the
30Hence, that function exhibits constant relative risk aversion with parameter ￿.














It is straightforward to check that induced policy preferences satisfy SP, SSC
and MS and that the peak is increasing in household income.31 Note that,
according to our results in Table 1, both the presence of risk aversion (with
DARA and thus u000 > 0) and of public sector distortions (with ￿00;￿000 > 0)
generate scroogeness. In particular, we are within the scope of Remark 3 in
the previous section.
The taste parameters ￿;￿ are chosen so that the median voter￿ s peak
matches US spending in K-12 education per pupil in 2006 ($9,138). We
compare two cases with di⁄erent coe¢ cients of risk aversion (but the same
peak): in example 1, ￿ = 2:2 and ￿ = 0:00024, whilst in example 2, ￿ = 1:5
and ￿ = 0:0032325. We follow the citizen-candidate approach in which costs
from becoming candidate and bene￿ts from holding o¢ ce are set at b = 0:8
and c = 0:46, and equilibria with candidates located too close to the median
do not exist.
Table 2 contains the results for three of the continuum of equilibria that
emerge in each example: the ￿rst column presents results of the equilibrium
with closest-to-median candidates, the second one an intermediate case, and
the third one the equilibrium with the most polarized candidates. The ￿rst
two rows contain the policy proposals of candidates Low and High. We
use yL and yH to denote the income level of candidates with platforms eL
and eH, respectively. Finally, the last row indicates the wedge between the
compromise policy and the peak of the median voter in percentage rates.
Results are also represented in Figure 4, which depicts the compromise policy
in the set of two-candidate equilibria of our examples as well as the median
voter￿ s peak.




~ y and since ￿ = tyi, it follows that ￿0 =
yi
￿
~ y2 ￿ 2~ ye
￿￿ 1
2 > 0; ￿00 = yi~ y
￿
~ y2 ￿ 2~ ye
￿￿ 3
2 > 0; ￿000 = 3yi~ y2 ￿
~ y2 ￿ 2~ ye
￿￿ 5




~ y2 ￿ 2~ ye
￿￿ 1
2 > 0
23Example 1 Example 2
eL 2.76 1.1 0 7.47 5.09 2
eH 14.33 15.38 16.02 10.73 12.75 14.89
yL 35.25 32.85 31.41 40.76 32.85 24.7
yH 66.57 71.80 75.38 57.15 71.80 98.67
e￿ 8.54 8.24 8.01 9.10 8.92 8.45
ep






m (%) 6.5 9.86 12.37 0.45 2.42 7.58
Table 2: Numerical examples
It is immediate to see that the order of magnitude of di⁄erences among
the median voter￿ s most preferred policy and the compromise policy in two-
candidate equilibrium can be signi￿cant (up to 12.37% in example 1). Such
di⁄erences increase monotonically with polarization, as long as eL is posi-
tive.32 If the low proposal, eL, does not reach its minimum fast enough, as
in example 2, then equilibria fail to exist with too polarized candidates. The
reason is that there are citizens with income between yL and yH who enter
to win the elections.
32Because spending proposals cannot be negative (or may be subject to some legal lower
bound), more polarization beyond the point were candidates cannot reduce their proposals
of public expenditure will not produce any e⁄ects on the compromise policy.
24Figure 5 depicts the degree of non-symmetry of policy preferences in
the two examples. Let V1 and V2 be the policy-induced utility function for
examples 1 and 2, respectively. Taking into account that the peak is the








1 (e;ym) in the whole
domain, Figure 5 con￿rms that the median voter in example 1, who displays
greater absolute risk aversion, has a larger (in absolute value) coe¢ cient of
non-symmetry and hence more scrooge policy preferences. In that case, the
wedge between the median voter￿ s peak and the compromise policy in two-
candidate equilibria is larger. Moreover, the impact of polarization is more
intense.
6 Concluding Remarks
The symmetry assumption of policy preferences is widely spread in the po-
litical economics literature. While this condition seems reasonable when the
policy issue at stake is purely ideological, our analysis revealed that it re-
quires placing very stringent restrictions on the primitives of an economic
policy problem. In order to study the political implications of asymmetric
policy preferences, we ￿rst introduced an induced preference relation over
pairs of symmetric deviations from a voter￿ s ideal policy, which we named
o⁄-the-peak preferences. We also named voters who prefer shortfalls in the
25level of spending over symmetric excesses with respect to their peak scrooge
voters, and those with the opposite policy tastes wasteful voters.
Our main ￿nding regarding the shape of preferences o⁄-the-peak is that
the sign of the third derivative of the policy-induced utility function with
respect to the policy variable indicates the direction of the bias of prefer-
ences towards overprovision (when V 0 is convex) or underprovision (when V 0
is concave). This feature of the policy-induced utility function is straightfor-
ward to check, and the result is applicable to a large body of policy prob-
lems, as long as preferences over policies are single-peaked. In particular, we
showed that in models of two-party political competition where candidates￿
platforms do not converge, the non-symmetry of policy preferences has a
relevant impact on the electoral result. To illustrate this point, we followed
the citizen-candidate approach, where the median plays the following cen-
tral role: while she is never o⁄ered her most preferred choice, equilibrium
platforms exactly counteract each other to make her indi⁄erent.33 Exploit-
ing that equilibrium requirement, we proved that the shape of the median
voter￿ s preferences o⁄-the-peak a⁄ects the policy outcome: whenever these
are scrooge (wasteful, or symmetric) the compromise policy implies lower
(higher, or equal) public expenditure than her peak.34 The concavity or con-
vexity of the marginal policy-induced utility function thus also determines
the direction of the wedge between the policy outcome in two-candidate equi-
librium and the median voter￿ s peak. Moreover, it allows the ranking of the
continuum of two-candidate equilibria, as public expenditure exhibits a larger
di⁄erence with respect to the median voter￿ s ideal policy in equilibria with
more polarized candidates.
Interestingly, the techniques used by Pratt to compare degrees of risk
aversion, and by Kimball to compare degrees of prudence, can be used to
33In a similar vein, and according to the membership-based equilibrium due to Caplin
and Nalebu⁄ (1997), if the platform of each party is the mean (or the median) of its
members, no member of the party can improve by moving to the other party, and there
exists a continuum of voters, then in equilibrium there must be an agent (not necessarily
the median) that is indi⁄erent between the two parties￿platforms.
34Again, note that policy preferences o⁄-the-peak are also crucial in models of electoral
competition with two di⁄erentiated parties (e.g. Caplin and Nalebu⁄, 1997). To see why
this may be the case, note that the median voter￿ s o⁄-the-peak preferences determine
which party wins. More generally, scrooge (wasteful) preferences of the median voter
provide candidates proposing low (high) spending with some electoral advantage. That
advantage may or not be decisive depending on the speci￿c location of the platforms in
equilibrium.
26compare degrees of non-symmetry of preferences. As we showed, Kimball￿ s
coe¢ cient de￿nes a partial order of preferences in terms of the intensity
towards overprovision (wasteful) or towards underprovision (scrooge). This
measure provides a tool that can be used, in future work, to analyze the
impact of speci￿c political reforms on policy preferences (where both, the
e⁄ect over the peak, and o⁄-the-peak are relevant to predict the electoral
implications).
Turning attention towards the determinants of preferences o⁄-the-peak,
our analysis then highlighted several factors that may give rise to scrooge
or wasteful preferences. Scrooge preferences emerge from DARA or CARA
speci￿cations of risk (or, equivalently, from a positive coe¢ cient of prudence).
Intuitively, DARA or CARA voters prefer to avoid too low a level of pri-
vate consumption rather than too low a level of public expenditure. Like-
wise, scrooge preferences result from goverment￿ s decreasing e⁄ectiveness,
i.e. whenever expanding government spending implies incurring an increas-
ing marginal cost of raising funds. On the contrary, suppose that voters do
not exhibit risk aversion, that the government is constant-e⁄ective and that
public expenditure is an input of the human capital production function. In
that case, if the law of decreasing marginal returns applies with more inten-
sity at lower levels of investment, voters will display wasteful o⁄-the-peak
policy preferences. Numerical examples illustrated the impact of a change in
the coe¢ cient of risk aversion and prudence on policy outcomes, and exposed
that the magnitude of the e⁄ects here identi￿ed may actually be signi￿cant.
Our main results extend to policy problems with a multidimensional pol-
icy space, provided that preferences over policies are separable in each issue
dimension. In that case, we can determine whether preferences over each
political issue shape the proposed forms (symmetric, wasteful, or scrooge) by
checking the sign of the third partial derivative.
27Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1:
By SP, there always exist a pair of policies (eL;eH) such that V (eL;ym) =
V (eH;ym) where eL < eH. De￿ne G(y) = V (eL;y) ￿ V (eH;y) and note









@y : In the former case,
@G(y)
@y > 0, and hence households with income below ym strictly prefer eH
over eL; whereas those with income above ym strictly prefer eL over eH:
In the latter case, we have
@G(y)
@y < 0; and preferences of households over
eH with respect to eL are reversed. Let us ￿rst show that the proposed
policies (eL;eH) qualify as two-candidate equilibrium. If two households with
preferred policies eL and eH respectively, become candidates, then there is
a tie. In that case, the compromise policy is e￿ =
eL+eH
2 : If b > 2c, then
V (e￿;yH)￿c+ b
2 > V (eL;yH) and V (e￿;yL)￿c+ b
2 > V (eH;yL); so that both
High and Low are better-o⁄running the election; that is to say, no candidate
has incentives to withdraw. Next, we show that no other household improves
by entering the race: If a candidate with preferred policy e; where e ￿ eL or
e ￿ eH; entered the race, she would give the victory to the candidate whose
platform is furthest from hers in the policy space. Likewise, a candidate with
preferred policy e 2 (eL;eH) that entered the race, could not win provided
the two other candidates are su¢ ciently close to each other. A candidate with
no chance of winning an election may still want to enter the race, as that
may modify the equilibrium policy to her bene￿t. A necessary condition to
enter in this case is V (eL;yi)￿c > V (e￿;yi) (when the preferred policy of this
additional candidate is in the interval (eL;e￿)), or V (eH;yi) ￿ c > V (e￿;yi)
(when the preferred policy of this additional candidate is in the interval
(e￿;eH)). In both cases, however, candidates with platforms eL and eH can
be located su¢ ciently close to each other to guarantee that whatever the
entry cost, the above conditions do not hold. Finally, suppose that there is
an equilibrium where candidates do not tie. Then, the candidate that loses
the election can improve by withdrawing from the contest, in contradiction
with the assumption that this is an equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 3:
We can write eL and eH as a function of d, so that eL = ep
m ￿ d and
28eH = ep
m + ￿(d) where
V (e
p
m ￿ d;ym) = V (e
p
m + ￿(d);ym):







m+￿(d);ym). Also, in equi-
librium, the utility loss from too low a level of provision (ep
m ￿d) must equal
the utility loss from too high a level of provision (ep















By SP, V 0 is decreasing and V 0(ep
m;ym) = 0. Scrooge preferences entail
￿(d) < d and, by MS, V 0 is strictly concave in e: Thus, for condition (13) to
hold, it must be the case that V 0(e￿￿d;ym) < ￿V 0(e￿+￿(d);ym). According
to ￿
0(d); scrooge preferences imply ￿
0(d) < 1: Wasteful preferences entail
￿(d) > d and, by MS, V 0 is strictly convex in e: Following the same reasoning,
under wasteful preferences, ￿
0(d) > 1. After straightforward manipulation,















where e￿0(d) < 0 when preferences are scrooge, and e￿0(d) > 0 when prefer-
ences are wasteful.
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